It’s a corporate takeover of global governance that affects our food, our data, our vaccines, etc.
‘The
Great Reset’ plan was triggered by the World Economic Forum’s (WEF)
summit in June 2020, which had the theme ‘The Great Reset’ and
argued that the COVID crisis was an opportunity to address the burning
issues facing the world.
The
theories around the Great Reset are hard to pin down, but piecing them
together gives us something like this: the Great Reset is the global
elite’s plan to instate a communist world order by abolishing private
property while using COVID-19 to solve overpopulation and enslaving what
remains of humanity with vaccines.
We really
need to know what the WEF’s Great Reset plan is about. At the
heart are secret agendas and malicious intent. While these may be
absent from the WEF's Great Reset initiative, what is something almost
as sinister is hiding in plain sight. In fact, more sinister because
it’s real and it’s happening now. And it involves things as fundamental
as our food, our data, and our vaccines.
The
magic words are ‘stakeholder capitalism’, a concept that WEF chairman
Klaus Schwab has been hammering for decades and which occupies pride of
place in the WEF’s Great Reset plan. The idea is that
global capitalism should be transformed so that corporations no longer
focus solely on serving shareholders but become custodians of society by
creating value for customers, suppliers, employees, communities and
other ‘stakeholders’. The way the WEF sees stakeholder capitalism being
carried out is through a range of ‘multi-stakeholder partnerships’
bringing together the private sector, governments and civil society
across all areas of global governance.
The
plan from which the Great Reset originated was called the Global
Redesign Initiative. Drafted by the WEF after the 2008 economic crisis,
the initiative contains a 600-page report on transforming global
governance. In the WEF’s vision, “the government voice would be one
among many, without always being the final arbiter.” Governments would
be just one stakeholder in a multi-stakeholder model of global
governance. The report is “the most comprehensive proposal for
re-designing global governance since the formulation of the United
Nations during World War II.”
Who are these other, non-governmental stakeholders? The WEF, best known for its annual meeting of high-net-worth individuals in Davos, Switzerland, describes itself as an international organization for public-private cooperation. WEF partners include some of the biggest companies in oil (Saudi Aramco, Shell, Chevron, BP), food (Unilever, The Coca-Cola Company, Nestlé), technology (Facebook, Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Apple) and pharmaceuticals (AstraZeneca, Pfizer, Moderna).
Instead of corporations serving many stakeholders, in the multi-stakeholder model of global governance, corporations are promoted to being official stakeholders in global decision-making, while governments are relegated to being one of many stakeholders. In practice, corporations become the main stakeholders, while governments take a backseat role, and civil society is mainly window dressing.
Perhaps the most symbolic example of this shift is the controversial strategic partnership agreement the United Nations (UN) signed with the WEF in 2019. Harris Gleckman describes this as a move to turn the UN into a public-private partnership, creating a special place for corporations inside the UN.
The multi-stakeholder model is already being built. In recent years, an ever-expanding ecosystem of multi-stakeholder groups has spread across all sectors of the global governance system. There are now more than 45 global multi-stakeholder groups that set standards and establish guidelines and rules in a range of areas. According to Gleckman, these groups, which lack any democratic accountability, consist of private stakeholders (big corporations) who “recruit their friends in government, civil society and universities to join them in solving public problems”.
Multi-stakeholderism is the WEF’s update of multilateralism, which is the current system through which countries work together to achieve common goals. The multilateral system’s core institution is the UN. The multilateral system is often rightly accused of being ineffective, too bureaucratic and skewed towards the most powerful nations. But it is at least theoretically democratic because it brings together democratically elected leaders of countries to make decisions in the global arena. Instead of reforming the multilateral system to deepen democracy, the WEF’s vision of multi-stakeholder governance entails further removing democracy by sidelining governments and putting unelected ‘stakeholders’ – mainly corporations – in their place when it comes to global decision-making.
Another landmark in the development of stakeholder capitalism can be found in the Big Tech sector. As a part of his 2020 Roadmap for Digital Cooperation the UN Secretary-General called for the formation of a new ‘strategic and empowered multi-stakeholder high-level body’. Again it's not easy to find a list of stakeholders but after some digging a long list of ‘roundtable participants’ for the roadmap includes Facebook, Google, Microsoft and the WEF.
Although the functions laid out for this new body are quite vague, civil society organizations fear it will come down to Big Tech creating a global body to govern itself. This risks institutionalising these companies' resistance against effective regulation both globally and nationally and increasing their power over governments and multilateral organizations. If the body comes to fruition, it could be a decisive victory in the ongoing war GAFAM (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft) is waging with governments over tax evasion, antitrust rules, and their ever-expanding power over society.
Then there’s COVAX. The COVAX initiative aims to “accelerate the development and manufacture of COVID-19 vaccines, and to guarantee fair and equitable access for every country in the world”. That, again, sounds wonderful, especially given the staggering inequalities in vaccination levels between rich and developing countries.
COVAX was set up as a multi-stakeholder group by two other multi-stakeholder groups, GAVI (the Vaccine Alliance) and CEPI (the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations), in partnership with the WHO. Both GAVI and CEPI have strong ties with the World Economic Forum (which was one of the founders of CEPI) as well as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and both are also connected to companies like Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, AstraZeneca and Johnson & Johnson through manufacturer partnerships (GAVI) or as 'supporters' (CEPI). Even though COVAX is funded predominantly by governments, it is these corporate-centred coalitions that are overseeing its roll-out.
The New World Order "Great Reset"
Has The Government Failed Us
“Has The Government Failed Us.” With that dramatic testimony before the 9/11 Commission, Richard Clarke, counterterrorism coordinator at the White House during the Clinton and Bush administrations, laid bare the raw truth of the government’s failure to prevent the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which killed nearly 3,000 Americans.
It was shocking. It was cathartic. It was also true.
It — or something like it — has been sorely lacking from the government’s accounting for the COVID-19 pandemic.
Don’t hold your breath. Although the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) announced they will be taking a hard look at their handling of the pandemic, political officials of both parties have transitioned seamlessly from swearing that they were going to “beat this virus” to discussing the virus as “endemic,” with little to no explanation for the failures to prevent, contain, and even to mitigate the virus’s deadly spread.
Comparisons of the preparedness and response to 9/11 and COVID are inevitable, and were made, in fact, in the earliest days of the pandemic, when a government official, echoing CIA Director George Tenet’s warning prior to 9/11, said that the public health care system had been “blinking red” since January 2020.
That comparison no longer seems hyperbolic; in fact, the scope of our nation’s failure to care for its most vulnerable people during the pandemic has been orders of magnitude worse than on 9/11. Ranked in November 2019, on the eve of COVID’s zoonotic spread, as the nation best resourced in the world to confront a pandemic, the United States has the highest mortality rate among the wealthiest nations in the world, and among the highest of all nations. More than one in 400 Americans has died from COVID-19. The pandemic has revealed the nation considered the best resourced in the world to confront a pandemic to be the worst in marshaling those resources to respond.
Contrary to the widespread popular and now bipartisan resignation over our situation, it didn’t have to happen. So why did it? Again, a 9/11 comparison is apt.
The national security apparatus in place prior to 9/11, and the public health infrastructure rated the world’s best prior to the pandemic, were the product of trillions of dollars of investment for the same bedrock purposes: to provide a multi-layered early warning system against a surprise attack and to support the institutions that could combat and mitigate the effects of an attack if it occurred.
Both seemed formidable prior to the critical events. But in both cases the systems failed dramatically and catastrophically, and for the same fundamental reasons: consistent failures in planning to consider the possible ways the threat could be manifested, and to plan for a response that would align decision-making responsibilities to meet real-world demands.
Both crises have exposed as unwarranted the assumptions on which planning had occurred. There were, for example, detailed plans drawn up prior to 9/11 for how the civilian and military authorities would handle cockpit security and hijackings. Hijackings were assumed to be political statements, in which demands would be made in return for an exchange of hostages. In other words, there would be time to react.
When, on 9/11, the hijackers breached the unlocked cockpits, killing the pilots, and turned off or scrambled their transponder signals and disappeared into the radar clutter, and when it became clear that their goal was not to seek to have demands met and land the planes but to use them as weapons of mass destruction, existing plans had to be discarded immediately and the response had to be improvised.
Similarly, in the early days of the pandemic, despite evidence of unexplained transmission, government scientists assumed that as a coronavirus, the new disease would be only modestly contagious, like the SARS virus. This assumption led to an early decision that only symptomatic people who had been exposed would be tested. As former CDC Director Robert Redfield put it later, “That whole idea that you were going to diagnose cases based on symptoms, isolate them, and contact-trace around them was not going to work. You’re going to be missing 50 percent of the cases.” Dr. Deborah Birx’s memoir, “Silent Invasion,” recounts her agonizingly frustrated efforts to persuade the CDC that the virus was spreading asymptomatically, and that testing needed to be expanded dramatically (“The CDC was operating in a bubble it had itself created”).
The failure to test asymptomatic people who were exposed to COVID early in the pandemic’s spread allowed the virus to disappear from the disease surveillance capability as surely as the hijacked planes had disappeared from primary radar on 9/11, hiding in plain sight as it spread silently, ravaging the population.
Both attacks, moreover, exploited the fault lines among bureaucracies. The 9/11 hijackers moved freely in the gaps of communication between and among international intelligence agencies — the FBI and CIA, the FBI and state and local law enforcement, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and NORAD, the FAA and the State Department, and the National Security Agency and critically important agencies.
COVID-19 exploited similar silos of bureaucracy, spreading effortlessly in the first instance in the gaps of communication among world governments, beginning with China’s criminal suppression of the truth about the virus as it lost containment and continued to deny evidence of human transmission.
Once the virus had reached the United States, there was persistent confusion among the states and the federal government about who was responsible for what. As Lawrence Wright puts it in his account, “The Plague Year”: “It was a national problem, but there would be no national plan. The pandemic was broken into 50 separate epidemics and dumped into the reluctant embrace of the surprised and unprepared governors.”
By late 2020, Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, concluded that this state-centered response to the COVD-19 pandemic was probably misguided: “When you’re dealing with a pandemic that doesn’t know the difference between the border of New Jersey and New York, or Florida or Georgia, or Texas and Oklahoma you have to have a degree of consistency in your response… .”
Just as 9/11 required a major rewiring of our national security structure to account for the reality of transnational terrorism, so our failed COVID response makes imperative a structural realignment of government roles and responsibilities to manage pandemics.
Our Constitution is the essential touchstone. As long as a pathogen can be contained, states should take the lead in containment measures; federal government agencies are there to support them. Once containment is lost, and the potential for mass fatalities across boundaries becomes clear, it is no longer appropriate for the states to take the lead; in its transformation from an epidemic to a pandemic, it also has been transformed from a public health emergency to a crisis requiring that we provide, as the Constitution’s preamble puts it, a “common defense.”
A crisis that, by its nature, calls for a “common defense” — the very justification for the creation of federal power under the Constitution — should be met with a unified and empowered federal response.
This would require a major realignment of responsibilities that should be defined by act of Congress. But before it can be accomplished, someone — a president, perhaps, or an association of governors? — must lead. Someone must step forward and galvanize reform by calling the pandemic response what it has been: a colossal failure of government. The pandemic needs, in other words, its Richard Clarke moment.
The question raised by 9/11 and the pandemic response is stark and ultimately existential: Must we accept large-scale institutional failure during crises as inevitable in our republic, costing thousands or millions of American lives?

